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In DefeŶĐe of the ͚Gold-Digger͛ 
Dr Sharon Thompson
* 
Abstract 
This article examines the gold-digging trope in family law. It explores the etymology of the 
term and how it has been employed in cultural and legal contexts, such as media, 
parliamentary debates and case law. It is argued that the gold-digger construct has 
shifted, in that it was once applied only to women who formed relationships with men for 
financial gain, but is now used against all women in the context of modern equality claims 
in family law, regardless of their intentions. Today, the gold-digger is any woman who 
seeks a fair share of family assets on divorce, and the concept informs ideas not only of 
claims to financial relief on divorce, but also the enforceability of prenuptial agreements. 
 
Introduction 
It is an unfortunate fact that the language of gold-digging features in conversations surrounding law 
reform. Most recently, in the UK Baroness Deech has introduced the Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill 
2016-17,1 the impetus of which is to fortify the system of financial provision on divorce against 
eǆploitatioŶ ďǇ the ͚gold-diggeƌ͛.2 
The gold-diggeƌ, aĐĐoƌdiŶg to BaƌoŶess DeeĐh, is a ǁoŵaŶ ǁho has ͚depƌiǀed iƌƌatioŶallǇ [a 
ŵaŶ] of eǀeƌǇthiŶg he had ǁoƌked foƌ͛, and it is ͚[t]he ǁife … least likelǇ eǀeƌ to haǀe put heƌ haŶd iŶ 
Đold ǁateƌ duƌiŶg the ŵaƌƌiage … [ďut] ŵost likelǇ to ǁalk off ǁith ŵillioŶs͛ (HL Deb (2014) 754 col. 
1491). AŶd so as Loƌd Daǀies put it, ͚[p]eople haǀe ďeeŶ deeply offended by some of the gold-digging 
– that is the word one must use – that has had a lot of puďliĐitǇ ƌeĐeŶtlǇ͛ (HL Deb (2014) 754 cols. 
1496-1497). In his view, the Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill ǁould ͚ŵake the laǁ ŵoƌe oďǀiouslǇ 
faiƌ aŶd just͛ (col. 1496), by limiting the awards that women, or to be precise, gold-digging women, 
receive on relationship breakdown. The perspectives of Baroness Deech and Lord Davies portray a 
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1 The Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill was first introduced in 2014 and was reintroduced in 2015 and 2016. 
2 If enacted, the Bill would prevent financial orders being made in respect of property acquired before the 
marriage, or through gift or inheritance (clause 2), limit the scope of periodical payments to a maximum of five 
years from the date of the decree of divorce, unless this would lead to serious financial hardship (clause 5), 
and make prenuptial and postnuptial agreements binding subject to procedural requirements (such as 
independent legal advice and material disclosure) at the time the agreement is entered into (clause 3). 
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woman who doesŶ͛t necessarily marry for money, but undeservedly receives a large sum on divorce 
in spite of having made no direct financial contribution to the marriage. However, to better 
understand the phrase gold-digger, it is crucial to further interrogate the context in which this label 
is applied, to look past the media͛s obsession with career divorcees, and to consider whether the 
vitriol directed at gold-diggers is justifiable or misinformed.  
To this end, this paper will examine the gold-digger accusation and in particular, the 
gendered nature of the concept, particularly in the context of marriage. The first section outlines the 
ŵeaŶiŶg of the teƌŵ, fƌoŵ the histoƌiĐal oƌigiŶ of ͚gold-diggeƌ͛3 in the early 20th century to its 
modern day use. Through this assessment, the image of a predatory woman is implied by the phrase 
gold-digger, which obscures the causes of economic dependency in the marital relationship, and 
does not account for the value of non-financial contributions to the welfare of the family. As a result, 
when gold-digging claims are taken at face value, it becomes easier to justify a reduction in the level 
of award to the non-moneyed spouse on divorce, whilst failing to recognise the adverse impact this 
would have on women (because the term is generally not applied to men).  
The consequences of this are considered in the second section of this paper, with a 
particular focus on the impact of prenups when presented as an antidote to gold-digging. It is argued 
that when used to protect the moneyed spouse from gold-digging, prenuptial agreements in reality 
protect inequality, and further entrench the discriminatory value attributed to direct financial 
contributions at the expense of recognising care. Put simply, when prenups are used to prioritise 
pƌoteĐtioŶ of the ŵoŶeǇed spouse͛s pƌopeƌtǇ, these agƌeeŵeŶts serve to mask much deeper 
problems. First, the power inequalities between parties entering into prenups are entrenched, 
because the gold-digging accusation levied against the non-moneyed spouse means she is required 
to prove her reasons for marriage rather than negotiating mutually beneficial terms. Secondly, the 
structural inequalities between men and women are exacerbated, because the non-moneyed 
spouse, usually the wife, has relinquished her rights to a financial award on divorce that would 
reflect the value of any non-financial contributions she has made.  On this analysis, an examination 
of the stigma attached to gold-digging helps us understand why prenups are gendered. Although this 
paper is focused on English law, reference is also made to the position of prenuptial agreements in 
New York in this section, to explicate some of the issues with binding prenups in another common 
law jurisdiction in practice. 
In the third section of this paper, the concept of the gold-digger is rethought, to determine 
whether a destigmatised version of the concept could be used to redress or at least challenge the 
gender inequity underpinning marriage and outcomes on divorce. To be clear, it is not being argued 
                                                          
3 In metaphorical terms that is, notwithstanding the original and literal meaning of an individual whose 
occupation was to dig for gold. 
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that women should prey on rich men or adopt a wholly mercenary attitude to marriage; the 
ĐoŶteŶtioŶ is, ƌatheƌ, that a ǁoŵaŶ͛s ƌeasoŶs foƌ ŵaƌƌiage should Ŷot ďe ƋuestioŶed aŶǇ ŵoƌe thaŶ 
a ŵaŶ͛s, aŶd these ƌeasoŶs ĐeƌtaiŶly should not justify scepticism towards wives in receipt of the 
financial share to which they are entitled on divorce. Yet this is what the gold-digger accusation 
does. If the term gold-digging is disassociated from moral repugnance, the term can no longer be 
used as a weapon against women. Furthermore, women would not have to sign a prenup to prove 
theǇ aƌe ŵaƌƌǇiŶg foƌ the ͚ƌight͛ ƌeasoŶs. However, there are a number of flaws with the 
reconceptualised gold-digger model; most patently, that if ǁoŵeŶ͛s financial position depends on 
marriage, ǁoŵeŶ͛s paƌtiĐipation in society on a par with that of men is not promoted (Fraser 1994, 
p. 610). IŶdeed, ƌeiŶfoƌĐiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s depeŶdeŶĐǇ oŶ ŵeŶ iŶ this ǁaǇ ǁould take women͛s positioŶ 
back to an era when financial dependence was expected, and gender equity in the public sphere was 
not possible. At the same time, the utility of this assessment is not completely undermined because 
it goes some way towards challenging the androcentric effect of prenuptial agreements (in that 
masculine perspectives are emphasised and men are consequently advantaged), and financial 
provision principles that limit the non-ŵoŶeǇed spouse͛s award.  
To assess whether it is right to defend and rethink the concept of ͚gold-digging͛, the general 
disdain expressed towards gold-diggers must be understood and challenged. This first requires 
examining the etymological and historical context of the concept. 
 
Part 1 - Historical background 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines the term gold-digger as ͚a woman who forms relationships 
with men purely to obtain money or gifts from them͛. This suggests material gain is the only 
motivation for a gold-digger, and interestingly, that men are not gold-diggers. Thus when 
investigating the context in which the term gold-digger is applied, it is important to question first 
why the notion of the gold-digger is gendered, and secondly why the term is considered to ͚offeŶd 
the puďliĐ͛s seŶse of justiĐe͛ (HL Deb (2014) 754 cols. 1496-1497). Following this, the last section of 
part one investigates the use of gold-digger in practice, particularly when opposing reform that 
ǁould fuƌtheƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌights. 
 
͚She’s a gold-digger, that oŶe͛ (Munsey 1918, p. 60) 
The reasons why ͚gold-digger͛ has historically been applied to women and not men can be gleaned 
from a closer inspection of the instances in which the term has been used. Gold-digger emerged as 
slang in the United States in the early 20th century (Beach 1911), and was popularised by a 1919 
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Avery Hopwood play entitled The Gold-Diggers.4 In this play, the protagonist forbids his nephew 
from marrying a chorus girl he suspects only wants his money. To help persuade his nephew against 
marriage, the protagonist enlists the help of another chorus girl who is described as ͚one of a band 
of pretty little salamanders known to Broadway as ͚gold-diggers͛, ďeĐause theǇ ͞dig͟ for the gold of 
theiƌ geŶtleŵeŶ fƌieŶds aŶd speŶd it ďeiŶg good to theiƌ ŵotheƌs aŶd theiƌ pet dogs͛. Interestingly, 
however, the chorus girls want to marry rich men in The Gold-Diggers so that they will not suffer 
financial hardship, like a former star of Broadway who they discover has been driven into low paid 
work. From this perspective, gold-digging was carried out by women fighting for economic survival. 
During the roaring twenties in the States, at a time of increased prosperity for many men, women 
were confined to low paid and low status jobs (Goldin 1980). Furthermore, the vast majority of 
American women did not work outside the home (Tentler 1986). A rich husband provided the 
opportunity of a better life at a time when participation in the labour market was not on equal terms 
(Fredman 1998, p. 98). Whilst the popularisation of the term gold-digger does not provide evidence 
that many women were entering relationships with men for purely financial reasons, the economic 
and structural inequality between men and women does explain why the term was gendered, in that 
women were more likely to marry rich men for financial security than vice versa. 
In Britain, the film adaptation of The Gold-Diggers (Gold-diggers of 1933) popularised the 
concept of the gold-digger, although it did not receive widespread critical acclaim, with one 
Ŷeǁspapeƌ desĐƌiďiŶg it as ͚Ŷauseous tosh͛ (Anon 1933, p. 427). The topic of gold-digging was clearly 
popular, however, as the success of Gold Diggers of 1933 led to the sequels Gold Diggers of 1935 
(1935), Gold Diggers of 1937 (1936) and Gold Diggers in Paris (1938). Other evidence that the term 
had permeated British culture included a short story published by Dion Clayton Calthrop (1932) 
about a moneyed man exploited by a woman, whom he referred to as a gold-digger. Thus on both 
sides of the Atlantic, gold-digger was a gendered word, reflecting (most likely) the stark socio-
economic inequality between men and women.  
In other words, ǁoŵeŶ͛s uŶeƋual footiŶg ǁith ŵeŶ iŶ the home and labour market meant a 
woman could simply not afford to marry a man who could not provide financial stability. Though 
single women had consistently participated in the labour market for a significant period (Auchmuty 
1975, p. 109), and replaced much of the work force during World War I,5 the attitude that women 
were less productive in the public sphere and more suited to work in the home was pervasive 
(Fredman 1998, p. 109). This justified ǁoŵeŶ ďeiŶg segƌegated iŶto joďs ǀieǁed as ǁoŵeŶ͛s ǁoƌk, 
such as domestic services, whilst positions in industry and government were reserved for men (p. 
                                                          
4 This was made into a silent film in 1929 entitled Gold-diggers of Broadway.  
5 FƌedŵaŶ Đalls this ͚tƌaŶsieŶt ƌeplaĐeŵeŶt͛ as ǁoŵeŶ ǁeƌe foƌĐed out of the positioŶs foƌŵeƌlǇ oĐĐupied ďǇ 
men at the end of the war (1998, p. 109). 
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109). WoŵeŶ͛s loǁeƌ paǇ ǁas also justified ďǇ the stereotype that underpinned the family wage; a 
concept that supported higher pay for men, as it was men who were expected to financially support 
the family.  
It was also assumed that single women had no duty to financially support anyone but 
themselves, and so their standard of living would be undeservedly higher if men and women were 
paid the same. These hypothesised relationship dynamics buttressed a vieǁ of ǁoŵeŶ as ͚the ŵost 
daŶgeƌous eŶeŵies of the aƌtisaŶ͛s “taŶdaƌd of Life͛, (Webb 1891, p. 635 cited Fredman 1998, p. 
109) which arguably also contributed to the feminine characterisation of the gold-digger. Yet as 
Fredman notes, these views clearly did not reflect the real needs of the parties involved (p. 109), and 
merely ƌeiŶfoƌĐed ǁoŵeŶ͛s suďoƌdiŶatioŶ as hoŵeŵakeƌs, or unmarried spinsters in relatively low 
paid work (Auchmuty 1975). As a result, the parity with men in employment, wages and education 
denied to women (Auchmuty 2012) meant that even though they could earn and control property in 
theiƌ oǁŶ ƌight siŶĐe the Maƌƌied WoŵeŶ͛s PƌopeƌtǇ AĐt ϭϴϴϮ, theƌe ǁas little oppoƌtuŶitǇ foƌ 
financial independence in marriage or for equal participation in the labour force for single women. 
Furthermore, married women had little control oǀeƌ theiƌ husďaŶd͛s pƌopeƌtǇ aŶd ŵoŶeǇ, ďeĐause 
sepaƌatioŶ of pƌopeƌtǇ, ;although a huge aĐhieǀeŵeŶt foƌ ǁoŵeŶ͛s ƌights iŶ eŶdiŶg ĐoǀeƌtuƌeͿ 
meant that it belonged to him and would be controlled according to his discretion. Whilst this 
highlights some of the context out of which the term gold-digger emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, 
today the backdrop against which it is used is quite different. 
More than forty years ago, Lady Summerskill observed that ͚[ǁ]e have heard so much … 
aďout a ǁoŵaŶ suppoƌtiŶg heƌ husďaŶd that I suppose that sooŶ ͞gold-digger͟ ǁill ďe applied to 
ďoth seǆes͛ (HL Deb (1969) 305 col. 862). One can understand why she made this prediction, as at 
this time, the sexual revolution, the Equal Pay Act 1970 and impending divorce reform indicated 
significant advances towards equality between men and women (see Auchmuty 2012). Today, 
however, ͚gold-digger͛ remains a term almost exclusively applied to women.6 One reason for this 
could be that structural inequalities continue to prevent women from being substantively equal to 
men in private and public spheres (Fraser 1994, Stewart 2013). But dependency between partners is 
not as it was in the early 20th century, and so these inequalities do not entirely explain why gold-
digging remains so heavily associated with women. A more convincing reason, perhaps, is that the 
definition of gold-digger has evolved into a caricature that is not associated with men. Although 
gold-digger is formally defined as a woman who forms relationships with men for financial gain, it is 
now more accurate to describe the use of the term gold-digger as a derogatory accusation used 
against a woman when she is perceived as reaping undeserved financial gain. Yet whilst there are 
                                                          
6 There is little evidence of the accusation being levied against men, although the husband was explicitly 
aĐĐused ďǇ the ǁife͛s fatheƌ of gold-digging in Luckwell v Limata [2014], [31]. 
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undoubtedly mercenary individuals in the world who wish to exploit others, there is no evidence 
that this is an exclusively female pursuit. Indeed, the gold-digging accusation is levied against women 
regardless of whether their intentions are influenced by money. 
 
͚You dolls ŵake ŵe siĐk, graďďiŶg at every ŶiĐkel you see͛ (Beach 1918, p. 220) 
It arguably is not difficult to understand why the idea of gold-digging is generally considered to be 
morally repugnant, because it is associated with greed, and gold-diggers are viewed as mercenary 
predators exploiting men. On the other hand, marrying for money has not always been considered 
improper, and in fact economic considerations have historically been central to the marriage 
contract (Shanley 1993). IŶteƌestiŶglǇ, hoǁeǀeƌ, ǁheŶ the teƌŵ ͚gold-diggeƌ͛ ǁas populaƌised iŶ the 
1920s and 30s in the United States and Britain, marriage was no longer the economic transaction it 
had been in the 19th century, and was based much more on companionship (Coontz 2006, p. 7). One 
possible explanation for this change was the legal reform enabling a married woman to control 
property in her own right (pursuant to the Married WoŵeŶ͛s PƌopeƌtǇ AĐt ϭϴϴϮͿ, combined with 
increased independence for women outside the marital relationship. The relative liberation brought 
by improved opportunities in education and in the work place, ǁoŵeŶ͛s suffrage, the sexual 
liberation of the flapper era and increasing divorce all contributed to transforming attitudes towards 
marriage. In short, marrying only for money was no longer acceptable. The glamourous, aspirational 
and arguably empowering lifestyles of gold-diggers portrayed in the movies of the 1930s were not a 
reality for women at this time. Indeed, the ƌise of ĐoŵpaŶioŶate ŵaƌƌiage, iŶ additioŶ to ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
enfranchisement and increased independence masked the grave inequalities persisting between 
men and women.  
A revealing example of this in Britain was the illusion of equality evoked by separation of 
property between married men and women that, as noted above, failed to reveal the struggles faced 
by married women, particularly on relationship breakdown, who did not have any income or 
property of their own. As Smart (1984, pp. 47-48) put it: 
 
Ironically the situation regarding matrimonial property was a consequence of matrimonial legislation 
which treated men and women as if they were equal. That is to say that the law presumed women 
and men were equally free to work or stay at home, to own property individually or jointly, and to 
aĐƋuiƌe assets … ǁhilst iŶ pƌaĐtiĐe it disadǀaŶtaged ǁiǀes ǁho ǁeƌe iŶ a stƌuĐtuƌallǇ diffeƌeŶt position 
to husbands. 
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In spite of this, the courts prevented women from retaining housekeeping money on divorce,7 and 
barred maintenance payments if the wife committed a ͚matrimonial offence͛. For instance, in Naylor 
v Naylor [1961], the wife was disqualified from recovering maintenance for herself and her child 
because the court found she had deserted her husband. Even though she did not leave the marital 
home, she was guilty of desertion ďeĐause she took off heƌ ǁeddiŶg ƌiŶg aŶd ͚peƌfoƌŵed Ŷo ǁifely 
duties͛ ([1961], p. 254). Therefore, a wife was on one hand punished for discontinuing domestic 
tasks (like in Naylor), but on the other hand she was not permitted to keep any money saved when 
undertaking such tasks. On this basis, the law not only reflected a formal (and misleading) equality 
between the spouses, but was also aiŵed at ǁhat LadǇ “uŵŵeƌskill ƌefeƌƌed to as ͚the tiŶǇ ŵiŶoƌitǇ 
of ͞gold-diggers͟ … lead[iŶg] a paƌasitiĐal eǆisteŶĐe͛ aŶd as a ƌesult ǁas ͚ďased oŶ pƌejudiĐe, Đustoŵ, 
and a failuƌe to ƌeĐogŶise that the ǁoŵaŶ iŶ the hoŵe is ŵakiŶg a ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ … ǁhiĐh should ďe 
ƌeĐogŶised͛ (HL Deb (1969) 305 col. 862). 
Since the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 (MCA), the judiciary has discretion to recognise these 
contributions. Furthermore, conduct is only taken into account when it would be inequitable to 
disregard it (section 25(2)(g)), and so the behaviour of spouses is no longer part of the financial 
assessment on divorce unless the case is one of extreme violence or fraud. As discussed further 
below, these changes together indicate that the court is now more concerned with making a fair 
award on divorce that does not discriminate against the non-moneyed spouse than it is with 
counteracting a small number of individuals hoping to marry for money. Unfortunately, the resultant 
shift towards equal valuation of spousal contributions (White v White [2000]) is opposed by those 
who believe this is a message to women that, as Baroness Deech has put it, ͚gettiŶg ŵaƌƌied to a 
well-off man is an alternative career to one in the workforĐe͛ ;ϮϬϬϵ, p. ϭϭϰϬͿ. In her view, gold-
digging is encouraged when the non-moneyed spouse receives a significant award on divorce as it is 
͚aŶ iƌƌitaŶt to ŵaŶǇ eǆ-husďaŶds ďeĐause theǇ haǀe to ĐoŶtiŶue to pƌoǀide … ƌegaƌdless of the ďad 
ĐoŶduĐt ǁhiĐh theǇ ďelieǀe ǁas eǀideŶĐed ďǇ the ǁife͛ (2009, p. 1142). Yet basing financial provision 
on the non-ŵoŶeǇed spouse͛s ĐoŶduĐt oŶ diǀoƌĐe would signal a return to penalising the 
͚undeserving͛ wife, an approach that the MCA sought to move away from. 
There is arguably another reason why substantial awards to the non-moneyed spouse on 
divorce are resented. Whilst these cases are often negatively associated with gold-digging, this 
association is not simply based on a fear of financial predators like those described in The Gold-
Diggers; it is fuelled by the idea that property rights deserve protection on divorce. As a result, 
judicial and legislative efforts to advance the protection of women on relationship breakdown have 
been hindered by a reluctance to allow claims that significantly interfere with property ownership. 
                                                          
7 See Blackwell v Blackwell [ϭϵϰϯ]. “uďseƋueŶtlǇ, the Maƌƌied WoŵeŶ͛s PƌopeƌtǇ AĐt ϭϵϲϰ eŶaďled ǁomen to 
save their housekeeping allowance and keep a one half share of it. 
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The risk of such interference could explain why the fear of gold-diggers is so disproportionate and 
acute. Then again, perhaps the accusation of gold-digging is merely a smokescreen that enables 
propertied spouses to more easily justify protection of their assets against competing interests. This 
would explain why gold-digging is so often used as a weapon against women when there is no 
evidence of avarice. 
 
The power of the gold-digger stereotype 
 If the term gold-digger is used as a strategy to safeguard property rights, then it is conceivably 
applied when there has been no gold-digging behaviour. This is problematic given that the term is a 
popular stereotype in modern culture, and is still based on the original metaphor of a woman 
exploiting a man for financial gain. But, the gold-digging stereotype is used in circumstances where 
there has been no gold-digging, or where the risk of gold-digging is not a central issue. A 
consequence of this misuse is that financial awards made in favour of the non-moneyed spouse in 
line with judicial and statutory authority are unjustifiably associated with this stereotype, 
particularly in the media (see, for example Cochrane 2008). This is clear on examination of the 
debates surrounding divorce and financial provision on relationship breakdown, which demonstrate 
how the concept of gold-digging has been used systematically to support or oppose legal reform 
affecting women.  
 
a) Financial provision on divorce 
The gold-digger accusation has been most consistently employed in the context of financial provision 
on divorce. When the non-moneyed spouse is given better protection under the law, this is usually 
countered by the contention that protection encourages exploitation. The debates surrounding the 
MCA clearly demonstrate this tension. The legislation was enacted to provide the courts with 
discretionary powers to divide property and assets so that spouses, and in particular women who 
had no opportunity to accumulate property of their own as a result of their work in the home, could 
achieve a degree of financial independence on relationship breakdown without being limited to the 
options of maintenance (which was not always paid), remarriage, or financial hardship. Whilst the 
MCA benefitted both spouses by introducing no-fault grounds, and thus facilitating the burial of 
many loveless marriages, it was also a landmark for married women in the 1970s, as organisation of 
the family home was still very much premised on the binary of male breadwinner and female 
homemaker at this time (Smart 1984). 
However, the Act has not been viewed universally as a necessary and positive step towards 
spousal equality. Since its enactment, it has been referred to in several House of Lords debates as a 
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͚gold-digger͛s Đhaƌteƌ͛ (HL Deb (2002) 636 col. 77) because it enables the wife to acquire rights in 
property directly earned by the husband without having worked outside the marital home. Such 
opposition was undoubtedly influenced by the idea that individuals should work to support 
themselves on divorce, regardless of the cost to their earning power that mothering or homemaking 
has had. Closely linked to this is the importance placed on the ways in which spouses come to own 
property that results in spouses with a claim based on non-financial contribution to be treated as if, 
iŶ “ŵaƌt͛s ǁoƌds, theǇ ͚did Ŷot Đoŵe ďǇ theiƌ shaƌe iŶ the pƌopeƌtǇ iŶ a legitiŵate ǁaǇ iŶ the fiƌst 
plaĐe͛ (1984, p. 105). This was evident in some of the outcomes for non-moneyed spouses in 
financial provision cases in the 1970s, 80s and 90s where financial and non-financial contributions 
were not valued equally. Indeed, the assertion of property rights on divorce meant that in cases 
where the paƌties͛ assets exceeded their needs, the non-moneyed spouse had no additional claim on 
assets directly earned by the income producing spouse if this would leave her with an award 
surpassing her reasonable requirements. The effect of this focus on direct financial contributions 
was that in cases with surplus assets, or even cases with medium level assets, the homemaking 
spouse was treated as a needy supplicant no matter what her contributions had been (see Dart v 
Dart [1996]).  
This foĐus oŶ ͚ƌeasoŶaďle ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts͛ was swept away by the House of Lords decision 
White v White [2000]. Before this case was decided several commentators had openly condemned 
the Đouƌt͛s limitation of the non-ŵoŶeǇed spouse͛s aǁaƌd for being gendered and discriminatory 
because the non-financial work in the home was typically undertaken by the wife (Cooke 2001). In 
White, this was highlighted by Lord Nicholls, who said the redistribution of assets on divorce should 
Ŷot depeŶd oŶ ǁhiĐh spouse ͚eaƌŶed the ŵoŶeǇ aŶd ďuilt up the assets͛, ďeĐause ͚[t]heƌe should ďe 
no bias in favour of the money earner and against the home-maker and child-Đaƌeƌ͛ (White v White 
[2000], [24]). As a result, financial provision should be cross checked against the principle of equality 
to ensure fairness of outcome on divorce. In practice, this did not affect cases where the assets 
could barely stretch to meet the parties͛ needs (Hitchings 2010), but in cases involving large 
amounts of wealth, kŶoǁŶ as ͚ďig ŵoŶeǇ͛ Đases, the lioŶ͛s shaƌe of the assets ǁas Ŷo loŶgeƌ 
reserved for the income producing spouse. The largest award to date for the lesser income 
producing spouse is £330 million (Cooper-Hohn v Hohn [2014]) which although significant still only 
reflected a 36% share of the assets. The wife cared for four children under five years old whilst in 
eŵploǇŵeŶt, ďut the judge deĐided that the husďaŶd͛s gƌeateƌ eĐoŶoŵiĐ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ justified a 
departure from equality. Theƌefoƌe, iŶ spite of the ǁife͛s douďle shift of ǁoƌk (Fraser 1994), her 
ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ ǁas Ŷot a ͚speĐial͛ oŶe ďeĐause iŶ ‘oďeƌts J͛s ǀieǁ, it did Ŷot ƌeƋuiƌe the ͚iŶŶoǀatiǀe 
ǀisioŶ͛ aŶd ͚speĐial skill aŶd effoƌt͛ that the husďaŶd͛s geŶeƌatioŶ of ͚tƌulǇ ǀast ǁealth͛ did (Cooper-
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Hohn v Hohn [2014], [282]). The way in which cases like this are reported in the media (see Charman 
v Charman [2007]) suggests that equitable division of assets causes the moneyed husband to be 
deprived of his property, as headlines consistently focus on the award received by the non-moneyed 
wife. This goes against the attitude promoted by White; that both spouses directly and indirectly 
have a role in the generation of marital property, and so the property belongs to both of them. But 
aligŶiŶg the geŶeƌal puďliĐ͛s attitudes ǁith those iŶ White is very difficult in practice, particularly 
when the gold-digger stereotype is so powerful. 
As noted above, Baroness Deech is one of the most vocal opponents of large awards for 
non-moneyed spouses in big money cases. OŶe of the Đouƌt͛s justifiĐatioŶs foƌ these aǁaƌds is that 
family life is often a significant impedimeŶt oŶ ǁoŵeŶ͛s Đaƌeeƌ pƌogƌessioŶ outside the hoŵe. 
However, Baroness Deech asserts that the outcomes resulting from this view are problematic 
because they encourage women to be dependent and even gold-diggers (HL Deb (2014) 754 col. 
1491). She argues very persuasively that disadvantages experienced by married women in the public 
spheƌe aƌe Ŷot attƌiďutaďle to theiƌ husďaŶds aŶd that ͚ŵaiŶteŶaŶĐe laǁs ĐushioŶ aŶd legitiŵise the 
attitudes of employers who discriminate against women, because they are aware of the ͞meal ticket 
for life͟ [oƌ gold-digger] ŵeŶtalitǇ͛ (2009, p. 1142).8 If Baroness Deech is correct, gold-diggers not 
only justifǇ ƌefoƌŵ liŵitiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s aǁaƌd oŶ diǀoƌĐe; gold-diggers also are to blame for 
discrimination against all women outside the family home. AŶd so if laǁs that ;iŶ BaƌoŶess DeeĐh͛s 
view) encourage and enable gold-diggers are reformed, women will be more equal and independent 
in society. 
The weaknesses of this view are exposed on closer inspection of gold-digging, because as 
this paper argues, the women labelled gold-diggers are usually not women who have ensnared men 
for money. Furthermore, research has consistently proven that economic dependence within the 
family is based on gendered social values, and is not simply encouraged by the system of financial 
provision under the MCA, just as career sacrifices made by women are not, as Baroness Deech has 
said, simply a ͚ŵatteƌ of ĐhoiĐe͛ (2009, p. 1142). Although there are more female principal 
breadwinners than ever before (Adkins and Dever 2014) this should not lead to assumptions as to 
the modern division of labour in the home, especially when the marriage has produced children. As 
Cynthia Lee Starnes (2006-2007, p. 208) puts it: 
 
                                                          
8 A ǁoŵaŶ͛s pƌesuŵed ǀieǁ of ŵeŶ as ͚ŵeal tiĐkets͛ iŶ this ĐoŶteǆt is iŶeǆtƌiĐaďlǇ liŶked to the ĐoŶĐept of 
gold-digging. As noted previously, gold-digging, by definition, involves any woman driven to enter relationships 
for financial gain (which presumably includes the pursuit of life long economic support) and is not limited to a 
ǁoŵaŶ͛s seaƌĐh foƌ luǆuƌǇ. Theƌefoƌe, ǁheŶ ĐastigatiŶg the gold-diggeƌ, phƌases like ͚ŵeal tiĐket͛ aƌe typically 
employed too. 
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AĐĐoƌdiŶg to ŵǇth, iŶ todaǇ͛s egalitarian, gender-neutral culture mothers and fathers co-parent, both 
working full-time in the paid economy and sharing equally in their leisure time the few family tasks 
that aƌe ƌeallǇ ŶeĐessaƌǇ … [Ǉet] EǀeŶ ǁheŶ a ŵaƌƌied ŵotheƌ ǁoƌks outside heƌ hoŵe she likely 
serves as the primary caretaker, undertaking a disproportionately large share of household chores. 
 
Therefore, limiting financial provision to caregiving spouses is not a safe or productive strategy for 
addressing structural inequalities between men and women. But the ͚ŵeal tiĐket͛, gold-digger 
mentality does not appreciate this reality, and has instead justified a gradual departure from the 
non-discriminatory approach in White v White (George 2013, 991). Indeed, in recent cases, the 
judiciary has become increasingly likely to depart from equality and place disproportionate emphasis 
on the financial contributions made to the marriage (see Jones v Jones [2011], Prest v Petrodel 
[2013]). This ultimately means that outcomes weigh more heavily in favour of the breadwinner on 
divorce, which in turn disadvantages women who have undertaken domestic and reproductive 
labour during the marriage. When the wife cannot point to financial contribution or show clearly 
that all of heƌ husďaŶd͛s ǁealth ǁas aĐƋuiƌed duƌiŶg the ŵaƌƌiage, heƌ Đlaiŵ is sigŶifiĐaŶtlǇ 
ǁeakeŶed aŶd is ŵoƌe likelǇ to ďe liŵited to heƌ ͚ƌeasoŶaďle Ŷeeds͛ (Jones v Jones [2011). This 
eĐhoes the afoƌeŵeŶtioŶed ͚ƌeasoŶaďle ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶts͛ appƌoaĐh that had ďeeŶ sǁept aǁaǇ ďǇ 
White v White for being discriminatory against the non-moneyed spouse. Yet uŶdeƌ todaǇ͛s 
reasonable needs assessment, a wife is not only required to justify why she married her husband in 
the past; she must also justify maintenance of her marital standard of living post-divorce, by 
producing a budget detailing what her needs are so an assessment can be made as to whether her 
Đlaiŵ is ͚ƌeasoŶaďle͛. 
 
b) Conduct 
Fears of gold-digging in the context of marriage and divorce have not only been elevated by 
equitable division of property on relationship breakdown; the increasing irrelevance of spousal 
conduct on divorce has also raised concerns. Prior to the enactment of the MCA, divorce was only 
possible if one of the spouses was at fault, and the commission of a matrimonial offence would 
affect financial provision. Thus couples wanting to divorce either had to establish fault or find a 
fictional basis for attaching blame. The MCA dealt with this by introducing no-fault facts to prove 
irretrievable breakdown (two years separation with consent and five years separation without 
consent). However, fault based facts (behaviour, desertion and adultery) were retained, and so 
pursuant to the MCA the UK has a quasi-fault-no-fault system of divorce. 
In 1996 the Family Law Bill (which later became the Family Law Act 1996, but was never fully 
implemented and is now repealed) sought to reform the MCA, introduce no fault divorce and permit 
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divorce after one year of separation ǁithout ďoth paƌties͛ ĐoŶseŶt. But this was opposed by those 
who believed the reasons for marital breakdown are important, gold-digging being a prime example 
of conduct that should not be overlooked. Divorce without the consent of both parties, and without 
any blame would make it easy for gold-diggers to marry, divorce and reap financial gain. As Lord 
Northbourne (HL Deb (1996) 570, 723) put it in the House of Lords: 
 
If Spouse A is seeking to obtain a divorce, and Spouse B does not wish to have a divorce, and Spouse B 
has not committed any fault, under the law as it exists at the moment, Spouse A would have to wait 
five years. Under the Bill which we have before us, Spouse A will only have to wait one year. 
Therefore that means that this Bill give an enormous opportunity for gold-diggers and for injustice if 
an unscrupulous spouse enters into marriage with a view to gaining financial advantage. 
 
This is a clear example of the power of the gold-digging stereotype, as it obscures the reasons for 
this particular reform. The importance of such reform was highlighted recently in research carried 
out by Anne Barlow et al. (2014), who found that preservation of fault based facts to prove 
irretrievable breakdown in the MCA exacerbates hostility on relationship breakdown. As was put in 
their report Mapping Paths to Family Justice (2014, p. 32): 
 
[T]here comes a jarring moment when the lawyer(s) or mediator(s) have to broach the issue of the 
grounds for divorce, and the fact that if the parties want to resolve financial issues and move forward 
now rather than waiting for two years, one of them will have to accuse the other and the other will 
have to accept the accusation of either adultery or unreasonable behaviour. We saw the capacity for 
this legal requirement to upset and antagonise parties and to disturb the equilibrium of the dispute 
resolution proĐess. GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s pƌoŵotioŶ of ŶoŶ-adversarial approaches to family disputes needs 
to be underpinned by a non-adversarial – i.e. no fault – divorce regime. 
 
In spite of the practical benefits of no-fault divorce, some practitioners have suggested that fault 
based facts are important to spouses who feel a sense of injustice on divorce (Bingham 2014). 
Petitioning for divorce on the basis of unreasonable behaviour or adultery is viewed by some as a 
public declaration that the other spouse is at fault, even if this has no bearing on the financial 
outcome. However, this aspect is not of central concern to those in fear of gold-diggers. Rather, no 
fault divorce would simplify the divorce process, and would conceivably make it easier for the 
͚Đaƌeeƌ diǀoƌĐees͛ fƌequently reported in the media. If, as this paper argues, these examples are not 
at all representative, then a cultural stereotype is impeding reform that would assist divorcing 
spouses in resolving their disputes. 
 
   
13 
 
c) Financial remedies for unmarried cohabitants 
The gold-digger stereotype has been consistently used as a reason to oppose legislation that would 
provide the court with redistributive powers on the relationship breakdown of unmarried 
cohabitants. Currently, England and Wales has no legislative provision that provides cohabitants 
with relief in the event of relationship generated disadvantage, and so couples dividing assets in this 
situation must instead navigate complex trust law principles that depend on direct financial 
contribution. Research has consistently demonstrated that this leaves the non-moneyed partner in a 
financially vulnerable position on separation (Barlow et al. 2008), particularly in cases determining 
ownership of the family home after a long relationship involving children (Douglas et al. 2007), and 
often women who have undertaken reproductive and domestic tasks have little recourse unless 
their name is on the property deeds. 
There is significant support to introduce reform similar to that carried out in Scotland. The 
Family Law (Scotland) Act 2006 provides that a former cohabitant can apply for compensation if she 
or he has suffered economic disadvantage, and his or her partner has experienced economic 
advantage, both directly as a result of the cohabitation (section 28(3)). In Scotland this Act provides 
the Đouƌt ǁith poǁeƌs to ĐaƌƌǇ out a ďalaŶĐiŶg eǆeƌĐise ďetǁeeŶ the paƌties͛ ƌespeĐtiǀe gaiŶs aŶd 
losses at the end of the relationship, but does not provide any of the same wide ranging 
discretionary powers exercised by the courts in England and Wales when determining financial 
provision on divorce. The Law Commission advocated reform similar to the legislation introduced in 
Scotland in its report to Government in 2007 and these proposals have received public support from 
Lady Hale (Gow v Grant [2012]) and Resolution (an organisation of family lawyers in England and 
Wales). IŶ additioŶ, tǁo pƌiǀate ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ďills haǀe ďeeŶ deďated iŶ the House of Loƌds: Loƌd 
Lesteƌ͛s CohaďitatioŶ Bill iŶ ϮϬϬϵ aŶd Loƌd Maƌks͛ Cohaďitation Rights Bill (first introduced in 2013 
and after parliament was prorogued twice, reintroduced in June 2015). Both of these Bills have 
received steadfast opposition in the House of Lords from those who believe that financial remedies 
for unmarried cohabitants would simply enhance gold-diggeƌs͛ suĐĐess ǁhen exploiting wealthy 
men. 
According to Baroness Deech, financial relief for unmarried cohabitants would lead to 
undeserved awards iŶ ŵaŶǇ Đases. IŶ ϮϬϬϵ she aƌgued that Loƌd Lesteƌ͛s Bill ͚ǁould ďe a ǁiŶdfall foƌ 
lawyers but for no one else except the gold-diggeƌ͛ (HL Deb (2009) 708 col. 1422) and in 2014 she 
asked of Loƌd Maƌks͛ Bill (HL Deb (2014) 757 col. 2074): ͚WhǇ should the ŵistƌess of a ƌiĐh ŵaŶ get, 
for example, £5 million after a Đouple of Ǉeaƌs of Đhildless ĐohaďitatioŶ?͛ 
BaƌoŶess DeeĐh͛s perpetuation of the gold-digger stereotype in this context is damaging. It 
drowns out the voices of women left homeless and financially destitute because there is no legal 
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recourse available to them; simply as a result of their marital status. But even though these women 
and their partners often function no differently to a husband and wife, Baroness Deech and many 
others do not believe this justifies access to rights and remedies similar (but not equal) to those 
available to married couples (Glennon 2008). In short, this approach does not appreciate the 
realities of dependency in intimate family relationships, and the concept of gold-digging only 
obscures these dependencies further. 
All of these examples demonstrate that there is a huge gulf between the portrayal of gold-
diggers in theory and the reality of iŶdiǀiduals͛ ďehaǀiouƌ ǁithiŶ iŶtiŵate faŵilǇ ƌelatioŶships. 
Therefore, the gold-digging stereotype constitutes a widespread overreaction to large awards on 
divorce. The stereotype operates by labelling women with no mercenary intent as gold-diggers 
simply because they have received a share of marital assets that they did not directly earn. The 
problem with this is that it leads to misconceptions in the media when a big money case is decided. 
Specific examples of this include Mƌ ViŶĐe͛s puďliĐ aĐĐusatioŶ of his foƌŵeƌ ǁife foƌ gold-digging 
(BBC News 2015), even though the subsequent settlement provided her with a relatively small 
award9 in recognition of her child care contributions over many years (Wyatt v Vince [2015]).  
Since the House of Lords explicitly placed substantive fairness at the centre of its decision in 
White v White, all women are being tarred with the 'gold-diggeƌ͛ ďƌush. The problem with this gold-
digging stereotype is that it hinders erosion of the sexual division of labour, and so in spite of the 
Đouƌt͛s ŵoƌe egalitaƌiaŶ appƌoaĐh to fiŶaŶĐial pƌoǀisioŶ oŶ diǀoƌĐe, wives undertaking domestic 
tasks iŶ additioŶ to eŵploǇŵeŶt ĐaŶŶot ŵatĐh theiƌ husďaŶds͛ unencumbered earning power 
throughout the marriage. Indeed, the dependencies and power imbalances within marriage are not 
discussed when focus is placed on the covetous spouse intent on exploiting her partner for financial 
gain. This is convenient for those in favour of binding prenuptial agreements, because as the next 
seĐtioŶ eǆplaiŶs, the iŵpetus foƌ these agƌeeŵeŶts is ofteŶ to pƌoteĐt the ŵoŶeǇed spouse͛s assets 
on divorce, and to prevent gold-diggeƌs͛ aďilitǇ to pƌofit from the marriage. 
 
Part 2 – Prenuptial agreements: the gold-digging antidote 
In Feminism and the Power of Law, Carol Smart argued that when women resort to law to improve 
their situation, this can trigger a backlash whereby the law is counter-used to re-establish traditional 
rights (1989, p. 138). On this basis, the substantive equality achieved through recognition of non-
financial contributions to the family is countered by the assertion of property rights in various ways, 
and the use of prenuptial agreements is an example of this. A prenuptial agreement is capable of 
decisive weight on divorce in England and Wales, provided the court does not decide it is unfair 
                                                          
9 Mƌ ViŶĐe͛s ǁealth is estiŵated to ďe appƌoǆiŵatelǇ £ϭϬϳ ŵillioŶ. The paƌties settled oŶ aŶ aǁaƌd to the ǁife 
of £300,000 to buy a house and a contribution to her costs (Wyatt v Vince [2016] EWHC 1368). 
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(Radmacher v Granatino [2010]). However, there is still no guarantee that a prenuptial agreement 
ĐaŶ safeguaƌd a ŵoŶeǇed spouse͛s assets, aŶd so theƌe haǀe ďeeŶ Ŷuŵeƌous Đalls foƌ ƌefoƌŵ that 
would remove the Đouƌt͛s poǁeƌ to set agreements aside for being unfair. The Law Commission 
(2014) recommended reform making prenups binding pursuant to the Nuptial Agreements Bill, 
provided the effect of the agreement on divorce would not leave either party in need. To date, the 
proposed Nuptial Agreements Bill has not been introduced in Parliament, but the Divorce (Financial 
Provision) Bill was introduced in the same month the Law Commission published its report. The 
Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill differs to the Laǁ CoŵŵissioŶ͛s Nuptial AgƌeeŵeŶts Bill because it 
contains no provision enabling a prenup to be challenged if a spouse͛s Ŷeeds are not met. In short, 
the message of the Divorce Bill is that prenuptial agreements should be binding with very few 
exceptions. Two principal justifications for this are examined in this section. 
The first reason advocated by those in favour of reform is that if a prenup is easily set aside, 
then the autonomy expressed by the parties in the terms of the agreement is not respected. Like 
contracts in business, the law should hold parties to their promises. At face value, this argument is 
persuasive because it implies that refusal to give weight to a prenup is tantamount to the judge 
telling the parties that he or she knows better. In the context of financial provision on divorce, a 
paternalistic approach that prioritises the court͛s idea of fairness over what the parties would 
consider to be a fair result is criticised by ŵeŵďeƌs of the judiĐiaƌǇ foƌ suppƌessiŶg Đouples͛ 
autonomy. Indeed, the now dominant perception in prenuptial agreement cases states that giving 
more weight to such agreements is important to enable individual couples to work out what is best 
for them (Radmacher v Granatino [2010], [51]). It should be noted that the judiĐiaƌǇ͛s eŵphasis oŶ 
autonomy is a recent development, and was brought to the fore in the Supreme Court case 
Radmacher v Granatino in 2010. Before this case, prenups were one of the many circumstances 
considered by the court when making financial provision, which was considered by some 
ĐoŵŵeŶtatoƌs as ͚pateƌŶalistiĐ aŶd pƌoteĐtiǀe of the paǇee͛ (Murray 2012). But the principle of 
autonomy is responsible for a significantly different judicial approach, whereby prenups are now not 
only prominent, but decisive in financial outcomes on divorce. However, prenups are not binding, 
because the MCA provides that financial provision is decided by the court, and so a prenup cannot 
replace this power unless legislation says so. To be clear, this means that the current situation is that 
a prenup needs the court to give it effect before it has any power, but if the Divorce (Financial 
Provision) Bill is introduced, prenups͛ power would be derived from statute. Changing the status of 
prenups in this way would provide couples with virtually unfettered power to control their property 
and finances in the event of divorce. 
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A second justification proffered by advocates of binding prenups is that the system of 
financial provision in England and Wales is flawed and couples should be able to contract out of it. 
As noted in the previous section, the system is criticised for involving great uncertainty and expense 
because it is not clear what a particular judge would consider as fair in any given big money case. But 
eǀeŶ if the Đouƌt͛s appƌoaĐh ǁas ŵoƌe tƌaŶspaƌeŶt, Baroness Deech has said that financial provision 
is still deeply unsatisfactory. In her view, equitable division based on equal recognition of financial 
and non-financial contributions creates an environment in which gold-diggers can thrive, because if 
spouses receive a large financial award in spite of making little or no direct financial contribution, 
the ŵessage is ͚͟[f]iŶd that footďalleƌ aŶd sit ďaĐk͛͟ (HL Deb (2014) 757 col. 641). She also asserts 
that the Đouƌt͛s appƌoaĐh is degƌadiŶg to ǁoŵeŶ, ďeĐause it eŵďodies the ĐoŶĐept that ǁoŵeŶ͛s 
dependency on men is inevitable rather than iŶĐeŶtiǀisiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s paƌtiĐipatioŶ iŶ the puďliĐ 
sphere: 
 
It is inconsistent if at one and the same time family law assumes that a woman can and should stay at 
home and care for their children and be compensated for that on divorce, and for society to call for 
women to take 50% of top jobs (2009, p. 1141). 
 
Furthermore, the woman who stays at home, is unemployed and married to a rich man fits the 
typical description of a gold-digger in modern society. But it is up to her to avoid this 
characterisation by signing a prenup. This belies the discourse of autonomy surrounding prenups, 
because by signing an agreement she is disproving her gold-digging motives, and this simultaneously 
inhibits her autonomy if she is less powerful economically and otherwise. Yet even a prenup might 
not be sufficient proof, as unless it is binding, according to Baroness Deech, the ͚gold-diggeƌ͛ can still 
receive a large award on divorce by having the agreement set aside (2009, p. 1144), although one 
could assume that the presence of a prenup would make the ͚gold-diggeƌ͛ ŵuĐh less ĐoŶfideŶt iŶ heƌ 
result. Nevertheless, the potential of an unenforceable prenup enabling the gold-digger to succeed 
made Baroness Deech ensure the Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill would allow very few agreements 
to be set aside. 
 Both of these justifications for binding prenups are connected to the concept of the gold-
digger. These justifications are also deeply flawed, because as discussed below, they are focused on 
the autonomy of the moneyed spouse, are based on assumptions about the context in which 
individuals enter into prenups and on assumptions as to the reasons for dependency within the 
marital relationship. In order to challenge these assumptions and uncover the reality of prenuptial 
agreements in practice, the next section draws on an empirical study of prenuptial agreements in 
New York, where prenups are binding. By examining the shortcomings of binding prenups in New 
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York, support is given to the view that reform in England and Wales pursuant to the Divorce 
(Financial Provision) Bill would be problematic. To highlight this, the impact of assumptions made 
about binding prenups in the debates surrounding the Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill is examined. 
It is hoped that this analysis will reveal why the negative stereotype of the gold-digger has the 
potential to cause significant damage to the non-moneyed spouse on divorce. 
 
An empirical study of prenuptial agreements in New York 
In 2010 I interviewed twenty attorneys in New York City on their views and experiences of prenuptial 
agreements. The interviewees were all experts on prenups and had been drafting them for clients 
for decades. In New York, prenups have been legislatively binding since the 1980s, and so the study 
provided an interesting insight into a jurisdiction where prenups are routinely enforced. The results 
of this research were disseminated in my book Prenuptial Agreements and the Presumption of Free 
Choice: Issues of Power in Theory and Practice (Thompson 2015) but it is useful in this paper to also 
consider some of the findings that are relevant to the debates surrounding gold-diggers and the 
Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill. 
In New York, the default system of financial provision on divorce is based on judicial 
discretion and equitable distribution, and operates similarly to the system of financial provision in 
England and Wales. However, a prenup will only be set aside in New York if it is procedurally flawed 
(for example, disclosure or legal advice was not adequate when the agreement was drafted) or if the 
court decides it is unconscionable at the time of enforcement. Every interviewee said it is extremely 
difficult for an agreement to be set aside on these grounds (2015, p. 84). And so the status of 
agreements in New York is comparable to the status prenups would have in England and Wales if the 
Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill (or reform of a similar nature) is introduced.  
 The assertion that prenups reflect the autonomy of the parties, and should therefore be 
respected by the courts, is undermined when the meaning of autonomy is probed. A striking finding 
of the New York study was autonomy is a flawed concept because power inequalities are a feature 
of every prenup. In most cases this is because there is disparity of wealth or income between the 
parties, which leads to an uneven playing field, as one attorney in the study explained: 
 
Oftentimes, there is a moneyed party, or a more moneyed party coming into the ŵaƌƌiage aŶd it͛s the 
more affluent party that is going to look for the agreement and preserve what he or she has coming 
into it and then dictating also what may happen in the event that the ŵaƌƌiage doesŶ͛t ǁoƌk out 
(2015, p. 81). 
 
   
18 
 
As a result, a prenup is often not the most accurate reflection of both paƌties͛ iŶteŶtioŶs because, as 
an interviewee in the study put it:  
 
[U]sually it is oŶe paƌtǇ I thiŶk pƌesses foƌ it. I haǀeŶ͛t seeŶ too ŵaŶǇ people at least iŶ ŵǇ pƌaĐtiĐe 
ǁho ďoth saǇ, ͞I thiŶk it͛s a ŵutual ďest iŶteƌest to eǆeĐute a pƌeŶuptial ĐoŶtƌaĐt͟ (2015, p. 80). 
 
Accordingly, foĐusiŶg oŶ a Đouples͛ autoŶoŵǇ as eŶshƌiŶed in their prenup is likely to lead to 
disproportionate emphasis on the wishes of only one party. This becomes particularly problematic if 
these wishes are influenced by a fear of gold-digging. Whilst there are a multitude of reasons why 
individuals decide to enter prenups, the study in New York found that often the non-moneyed 
spouse signs a prenup to prove she is not marrying for money, or the moneyed spouse insists on a 
prenup to be reassured he is not marrying a gold-digger. There were several anecdotes from 
attoƌŶeǇs ǁheƌe theiƌ ĐlieŶts oƌ ĐlieŶt͛s paƌtŶeƌs ǀieǁed the agƌeeŵeŶt alŵost as a litŵus test foƌ 
gold-digging, but one story in particular stood out: 
 
She did not want the prenup. He insisted and at the last minute he capitulated and said it was alright. 
It ǁas alŵost like it ǁas a test. AŶd ďeĐause she said she ǁould do it, [he kŶeǁ] ͚ok Ǉou͛ƌe not 
marrying me for my money (2015, p. 196). 
 
This kiŶd of ͚test͛ is rather perverse when considering that prenups enable the wealthy spouse to 
protect their money from equitable division in the event of divorce. If anything, prenups bring the 
financial aspect of marriage to the fore. And by testing the love of the non-moneyed party in this 
way, the wealthy party implicitly does not trust them, or perhaps needs to convince third parties, 
such as affluent parents. Yet this is obscured by the gold-digging stereotype, which causes the 
intentions of the non-moneyed, (not the moneyed) party to be interrogated. Proponents of the 
Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill are unlikely to find this problematic, as in the House of Lords 
debates, prenups were discussed a means of keeping gold-diggers oƌ ͚aliŵoŶǇ dƌoŶes͛ at ďaǇ (HL 
Deb (2014) 754 col. 1491). But research suggests this attitude is harmful, because it does not place 
the non-ŵoŶeǇed paƌties͛ fiŶaŶĐial deŵaŶds, Ŷeeds aŶd ĐhoiĐes oŶ a paƌ ǁith those of the ŵoŶeǇed 
spouse (Atwood 1993). Afteƌ all, the ŵoŶeǇed spouse͛s iŶteŶtioŶs Ŷot to shaƌe iŶ the fƌuits of the 
marriage are not scrutinised. And, in any case, either paƌtǇ͛s ƌeasoŶs foƌ ŵaƌƌǇiŶg should Ŷot ďe 
inspected, not least because people marry for various reasons, including financial gain and security. 
Focusing only on the motivations of the non-moneyed spouse not only leads to a false impression of 
the prevalence of gold-diggers, but also has a detrimental impact on financial outcomes on divorce. 
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The impact of the gold-digging accusation 
The gold-digging stereotype is particularly detrimental in the context of prenups, as it leads to the 
use of these agreements as proof that the non-moneyed spouse is marrying for love, not money. 
When they think it is only a test of their affections, it distracts the parties from appreciating the 
consequences of a prenup, when the terms could be catastrophic for the non-moneyed spouse on 
divorce. In the extract discussed above, the attorney was relieved that the prenup signed by her 
ĐlieŶt ǁas oŶlǇ a ͚test' because if it had bound the parties the wife would have been left in an 
economically precarious position: 
 
I was sort of pleased for her [that the husband changed his mind about the prenup] because the 
terms of the agreement were egregious in my opinion. And by that I mean she was going to be put in 
the position of probably not working with children (Thompson 2015, p. 196). 
 
Thus, when used to protect the moneyed spouse from gold-digging, prenups exacerbate issues of 
power between the parties by manipulating and undermining the non-ŵoŶeǇed spouse͛s aďilitǇ to 
negotiate an award that could reflect her projected non-financial contribution.  
The risk of entering into an agreement that favours the moneyed spouse is heightened by 
͚ďouŶded ƌatioŶalitǇ͛. This teƌŵ has eŵeƌged fƌoŵ research showing that parties are unrealistic 
about the prospect of divorce and consequently the likelihood of their prenup ever coming into 
effect (Baker and Emery 1993). Whilst independent and competent legal advice is a very important 
part of helping parties understand the consequences of a prenup (Fehlberg and Smyth 2005), 
evidence suggests this advice is not always listened to (Thompson 2011). In short, pressure to sign a 
prenup is more powerful when the non-moneyed party believes the agreement will never take 
effect, but this is worsened when she is intent on proving she is not the stereotypical gold-digger. 
Such power inequalities greatly undermine the contention that prenups reflect the intentions of 
both parties in the event of divorce, particularly when the agreement really only reflects the 
autonomy of the party intent on having a prenup to protect their property and avoid the default 
system of financial provision on divorce.  
 To be clear, the impact of the gold-digging accusation on the non-moneyed spouse is critical 
if it contributes to spouses signing away entitlement they would otherwise have on divorce. The 
Đouƌt͛s ƌeĐogŶitioŶ of non-financial contributions can be contracted out of by prenup and a spouse is 
more likely to agree to this if the aim is to avoid any gold-digging accusation. This is especially 
harmful for spouses that make prenups on the basis of their financial independence at the time of 
the wedding, but changes in circumstance during the marriage create dependency and leave 
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spouses in a completely different position at the end of a lengthy relationship. As Regan (1999, pp. 
189-90) has put it: 
 
While it is plausible to say that members of an economic partnership may regard themselves as 
strangers in the market after the partnership ends, it is far less reasonable to characterize ex-spouses 
solely in this way. Ex-spouses are not simply individuals who revert to the status of detached 
individuals. They have shared an experience that has affected them deeply, so much that in a sense 
they are not the same persons they were when they entered the marriage.  
 
Therefore, if not only the circumstances, but the parties themselves have changed, it is likely that 
the pƌeŶup ǁill Ŷot ƌefleĐt ďoth paƌties͛ ǁishes oŶ ƌelatioŶship ďƌeakdoǁŶ. This demonstrates why it 
is so problematic to make prenups binding with very few exceptions. 
Crucially, these issues affect women more than they affect men. That is, prenuptial 
agreements are androcentric in their effect because they prioritise the protection of property. This is 
problematic because the moneyed spouse in the prenup is usually the husband, and women are 
more likely to undertake domestic and child care tasks than men (Duncan et al. 2003, Starnes 2006-
2007). As a result, prenuptial agreements have a gendered dimension (Radmacher v Granatino 
[2010], [137]), and this is exacerbated by the fact that gold-digging is a gendered term too (Brod 
1994). Although women do instigate prenups, and it is increasingly common for the woman to be 
the breadwinner (Adkins and Dever 2014), attorneys in the New York study referred to the non-
moneyed party in a prenup as the ǁife, ͚ďeĐause it alŵost alǁaǇs is͛ (Thompson 2015, p. 81). The 
study found that the source of the wealth is also gendered, in that when the moneyed spouse is the 
wife, this is generally because she has inherited wealth rather than earned a significant income 
(2015, p. 82). In the reported prenup cases in England and Wales this trend is also clear, as the 
wealth belonging to moneyed wife in Radmacher v Granatino [2010] and in Luckwell v Limata [2014] 
was inherited, but in cases where the moneyed spouse was the husband, the wealth has been 
generated from success in the workplace (Z v Z (No 2) [2011], Kremen v Agrest (Financial Remedy: 
Non-Disclosure: Postnuptial Agreement) [2012], AH v PH [2013]).  This shows that in spite of the rise 
of female breadwinner, those earning huge amounts of money surplus to needs are still men. 
Protecting these assets by prenup effectively protects the structural inequalities that lead to these 
gendered differences, and perpetuating the gold-digger stereotype will only entrench these 
inequalities further. 
  
Part 3 – Defending the gold-digger: consequences and criticisms 
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Historically, the gold-digging stereotype has obscured structural divisions affecting women on 
relationship breakdown, and has justified the protection of property over recognition of care-based 
contribution. Therefore, the stereotypical image of the gold-digger is patently detrimental to the 
non-moneyed partner, and to women. Yet it is infinitely more difficult to change attitudes 
surrounding gold-digging than it is to propagate the stereotype surrounding the concept. There is no 
doubt that it is an insult to be called a gold-digger. However, in this section, a thought experiment is 
used to assume that gold-digging does not have negative connotations, so that the strengths and 
weaknesses of the concept can be assessed. The purpose of this is to address the question of 
whether defending gold-digging could be useful for women to whom this stereotype is applied, or if 
the term should instead be abandoned. 
 
Can gold-digging be defended? 
If gold-digging was accepted in society, a number of positive outcomes are conceivable. For instance, 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵotiǀatioŶs foƌ choosing a moneyed partner would not be questioned any more than 
ŵeŶ͛s, aŶd so the seǆist puƌsuit of poliĐiŶg ǁoŵeŶ͛s iŶteŶtioŶs upoŶ ŵaƌƌiage would cease. One 
consequence of dispelling concern for gold-digging intentions is that prenups could be negotiated 
differently, so that the non-moneyed party would no longer have to prove she is not marrying solely 
for money. Furthermore, even though the gold-digging stereotype is often not directly responsible 
for power inequalities affecting prenups, it does often overshadow these inequalities when prenups 
aƌe deďated. BaƌoŶess DeeĐh͛s DiǀoƌĐe ;FiŶaŶĐial PƌoǀisioŶͿ Bill is a Đleaƌ eǆaŵple of this, as it 
purports to defeat gold-diggers by making prenups binding, but its provisions (if introduced) would 
leave the court with little flexibility to recognise the fundamental problems with such agreements. 
However, when concern for gold-diggers is removed from this context, these problems can be 
brought into focus. As noted above, a major problem with prenups is their androcentric effect on 
divorce whereby masculine values take precedence and inevitably advantage men. That is, changed 
circumstances typically require caregiving sacrifices to be made by the wife, which are devalued on 
divorce if unaccounted for in the prenup. Therefore, the effect of prenups is androcentric because, 
as Fraser has put it, they can be used to undervalue practices that are associated with women (1994, 
p. 600). Whilst destigmatising gold-digging does not directly address this issue, it indirectly 
challenges androcentrism by ending the use of prenups as a gold-digging antidote. 
 The effect that a positive view of gold-digging would have on the value attributed to 
domestic and caregiving tasks should not be underestimated. Women carrying out these tasks are 
not stereotypical gold-diggers, but as this paper has contended, they are often labelled as such when 
recognition of their work interferes with the property interests of the money producing partner. This 
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has arguably hindered substantive equality for spouses on divorce. A reconceptualisation of gold-
digging would not just improve matters for the economically vulnerable in these individual settings; 
but could also change the wider context in which care and property interests are valued. In other 
words, if gold-digging is not stigmatised, it has no power to undermine the value of non-financial 
contributions to the family. Accordingly, interference with property rights is easier to justify. 
 A more radical consequence of re-evaluating gold-digging (and the associated value attached 
to property and care) is that gold-diggers could redistribute wealth between income producing and 
non-moneyed partners. Such redistribution would take place on gender lines, because as noted 
above, the moneyed partner in a prenup is usually male, and women are economically 
disadvantaged as a result of wider structural inequalities. Gold-digging could challenge this economic 
inequality if relationships based on financial gain are encouraged. Indeed, one might ask why it is 
wrong to marry for money if this would elevate the economic position of women in society. After all, 
middle-aged ǁealthǇ ŵeŶ steƌeotǇpiĐallǇ ͚tƌade iŶ͛ theiƌ fiƌst ǁiǀes foƌ younger ͚trophy͛ wives and 
this arguably is at least as morally questionable as gold-digging. Yet these men are derided far less; 
in fact, male self-interest is accepted and often assumed in society (England 2009, 37). If women 
were expected to be similarly self-interested, their choice to marry for money could arguably be 
viewed as rational instead of mercenary.  
Furthermore, Deech maintains stereotypical gold-digging wives make no contribution 
because they marry aŶd ͚sit ďaĐk͛ ;HL Deb (2014) 757 col. 641) whilst husbands work hard to 
contribute financially, but this is not necessarily the case. Even if a gold-digger does not cook, clean 
or change nappies, this does not mean she makes no contribution. Moreover, it is difficult to accept 
that a husband derives no benefit from marrying a trophy wife. Conran v Conran [1997] 
demonstrates that contribution to the marriage need not be in the form of traditional caregiving 
tasks, as iŶ this Đase the ǁife͛s ĐoŶtƌibutions included her skill, energy and creativity in hosting and 
participating in business dinners at the family home, which were important in enhancing her 
husďaŶd͛s ƌeputatioŶ. Destigmatising the gold-digger could address gendered norms that otherwise 
vilify women for making what could be viewed as rational economic choices when marrying, and 
could also enable the services trophy wives provide to be recognised as contributions to the 
relationship. 
 However, destigmatising gold-digging so that it is no longer used as a weapon against 
women is very different from actively promoting gold-digging. Encouraging women to seek out rich 
men raises a host of difficult questions that require further examination below. 
 
Should the term ͚gold-digging͛ be abandoned? 
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An instinctive reaction to destigmatising the gold-digger is that it would incite many more women to 
marry wealthy men instead of earning their own money (Deech 2009). But there is arguably no 
concrete evidence women are at all more likely to exhibit this behaviour than men,10 whether gold-
digging is a negative stereotype or not. However, within this thought experiment, it is important to 
assess whether stripping away the negative connotations of gold-digging is preferable to getting rid 
of the concept. One potential benefit of gold-digging is that it could be used to challenge economic 
inequalities between breadwinner and care provider. Yet on closer inspection, the problems with 
destigmatising gold-digging are numerous.  
 Whetheƌ soĐietǇ͛s ǀieǁ of gold-digging is positive or negative, the gendered nature of the 
term is damaging because the portrayal of women as gold-diggers assumes their economic 
dependency on men, aŶd ƌeiŶfoƌĐes ďeliefs of theiƌ deǀiousŶess aŶd use of ͚feŵiŶiŶe ǁiles͛ to tƌap 
men. Although economic dependency is often the reality for women, the concept of gold-digging 
does nothing to challenge this. Even if gold-digging could indirectly provide caregivers with more 
financial security, it ǁould eǆaĐeƌďate ǁoŵeŶ͛s ŵaƌgiŶalisatioŶ fƌoŵ eŵploǇŵeŶt, aŶd impede 
ǁoŵeŶ͛s paƌtiĐipatioŶ iŶ the puďliĐ spheƌe (Fraser 1994, p. 609). By keeping gold-diggers out of 
puďliĐ spaĐes aŶd iŶ the hoŵe, ĐaƌegiǀiŶg ǁoƌk is siŵplǇ ƌeiŶfoƌĐed as ǁoŵeŶ͛s ǁoƌk (Fredman 
1998). The promotion of gold-digging would do nothing to highlight the fundamental value of care in 
the home, because the stereotypical gold-digger does not make a care based contribution, she 
deǀotes heƌ tiŵe to speŶdiŶg heƌ husďaŶd͛s ŵoŶeǇ. In short, the hypothetically positive view of 
gold-digging could conceivably stop the chastisement of caregivers in receipt of substantial financial 
awards on divorce, but it would not recognise care because awards would be made regardless of 
contribution. Thus, the value attached to caregiving contributions would be unlikely to change 
within this thought experiment.  
 On the other hand, gold-digging, with all of its negative consequences, is an important 
concept because it highlights some of the problems with the way in which ǁoŵeŶ͛s paƌtiĐipatioŶ iŶ 
society is viewed. Vehement opponents of gold-digging are in favour of an inflexible obligation on 
spouses to be financially independent. Women have to fit into patriarchal patterns of employment in 
order to succeed on a par with men, and yet research consistently shows that women also continue 
to carry out the majority of domestic tasks in the home (Duncan et al. 2003, Adkins and Dever 2014, 
Starnes 2006-2007). The solution, therefore, must challenge the sexual division of labour inside the 
home and the structural inequalities outside it. Whilst gold-digging (even when reconfigured) does 
not successfully do either, examining the use of the concept in practice does leave the claims made 
by commentators such as Baroness Deech, and the legislative reform encouraged by these views 
                                                          
10 Although see Denike (2016), who explains how theories of evolutionary psychology have been used as 
evidence that women are more susceptible to gold-digging. 
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open to challenge. Furthermore, if the inaccuracies and stereotypes associated with gold-digging are 
understood, more is revealed about how the protection of property has caused women to be 
discriminated against. 
 
Conclusion 
Fƌoŵ ŵusiĐ suĐh as KaŶǇe West͛s soŶg Gold-digger, to filŵs suĐh as the CoeŶ Bƌotheƌ͛s Intolerable 
Cruelty, to debates in the House of Lords, the message to wealthy men is clear: be wary of gold-
digging women, and get a prenup. The depiction of gold-digging in these contexts resonates with 
“aŶdƌa FƌedŵaŶ͛s oďseƌǀatioŶ: 
 
Stereotypical images of women have throughout the ages been used to justify detrimental treatment. 
Because women are classified as different in the relevant respects, it appears justifiable to subject 
them to detrimental treatment (1998, p. 301). 
 
Although Fredman was not writing specifically about gold-diggers, her words accurately capture the 
problem with the gold-digging stereotype, as it has consistently justified detrimental treatment of 
women. To ďe pƌeĐise, iŶ the faŵilǇ ĐoŶteǆt it has justified the pƌoteĐtioŶ of the ŵoŶeǇed paƌtǇ͛s 
property to the detriment of the non-moneyed party. Most recently, the stereotype has driven 
support for reform by the Divorce (Financial Provision) Bill, which would limit provision to the non-
moneyed spouse on relationship breakdown, and make prenuptial agreements binding with very 
few exceptions. Like many of the legal developments influenced by fears of gold-digging, this Bill 
would disproportionately harm women. 
Unfortunately, the conversations surrounding this Bill do not appear to appreciate the effect 
of the gold-digger accusation. The term is often used against women simply because they are 
entitled to a share in property directly earned by their spouse, and regardless of whether their intent 
is suspect. “iŶĐe the teƌŵ eŵeƌged iŶ the eaƌlǇ tǁeŶtieth ĐeŶtuƌǇ, ͚gold-diggeƌ͛ has ďeeŶ used to 
deny women rights in property owned by men. Perhaps this is because it is easier to count the 
financial cost of divorce than it is to count the non-financial one. The income producing spouse can 
calculate the amount of earnings lost to the non-moneyed spouse, but the cost of care provided by 
the non-moneyed spouse cannot be quantified. Those who employ the gold-digging stereotype do 
not consider these intangible costs, because non-financial contributions are not visible in the way 
that financial contributions are. 
In conclusion, gold-digging is associated with greed, and with morally reprehensible 
behaviour. But the term is applied to women who clearly do not fit within this stereotype. From this 
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perspective, the gold-digger is not mercenary, exploitative or manipulative; she is a woman entitled 
to property because she has shared and indirectly created it during her relationship. Understanding 
the gold-digger in this way does not defend the use of the stereotype, but it does defend the women 
to whom it is applied. And in doing so, it is hoped, the power of the gold-digging stereotype is lost. 
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